§The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Oliver Lyttelton) The hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) and the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) have tried to make moderate and constructive speeches. I think it is my duty to set out the whole of the facts and I will do so and deal with nearly all the points which both have raised, including the inaccuracies with which the speech of the hon. Member for Oldham, West was, unfortunately, interlarded.
Several months ago, in the middle of August to be precise, we became aware that a crisis might develop in Uganda and I had the advantage of seeing the
1243Governor, Sir Andrew Cohen, on a recent visit. The developments of this crisis have caused the Governor, Her Majesty's Government, and myself grave and mounting concern during the past six or eight weeks.
As soon as I heard of these events, that is to say, last August, I give the House my word that I was determined not to take action except in the last resort, and then only when I was quite sure that the future of Uganda was at stake. I assure the House with the greatest sincerity that throughout these many weeks I have endeavoured by every means that I could to avoid the drastic steps which, in the event, have proved necessary.
I was prepared to take any means available to me to bring the Kabaka into agreement with Her Majesty's Government and with the obligations which are governed by the 1900 Treaty. I was prepared to concede any points which did not affect vitally the future of Uganda. Throughout the whole of this period I have been in constant, almost daily, touch with Sir Andrew Cohen on what were the best methods to pursue with this object in view. I mentioned this long period and the constant consultations that have taken place in order to rebut the remark by the hon. Member for Oldham, West that these decisions were made in a frivolous, abrupt, hasty and inconsiderate way.
First, let us be quite clear about the nature of this crisis. Quite simply, the fact is that recognition has been withdrawn from the Kabaka because he has declared himself determined publicly to oppose the considered decisions and the declared policy of Her Majesty's Government. In places, the hon. Member for Oldham, West was grossly inaccurate as when he was talking about this particular point. What we sought to get from the Kabaka on this point was a declaration that he would not, in the Lukiko, openly oppose the policy of Her Majesty's Government on this matter of a unitary State. I shall come to that in a minute.
Not only was this attitude a denial of his solemn obligation under the agreement of 1900 which has in the main since regulated the relations between Her Majesty's Government and the Buganda Government, but if he had been per-
1244mitted to carry out his intentions into action, the orderly and progressive administration of Buganda would have been made impossible. By the attitude which he adopted and by the persistence with which he clung to it in the face of all our efforts to dissuade him, the Kabaka demonstrated quite unmistakably that he was resolved to break the Agreement of 1900.
Here, I must say a few words about that Agreement. As the House will recall, this was a compact freely negotiated and signed by the representatives of Her Majesty's Government of the time and the Buganda Government. On many occasions since it was concluded both parties to it have shown the high importance which they attached to the scrupulous observance of all its terms. For more than 50 years it has remained unaltered, save in matters of detail, and these minor amendments have only been made with the approval of both parties.
I forget whether the hon. Gentleman quoted Article 6 of the Agreement. He will forgive me if I am repeating it. It reads: So long as the Kabaka, Chiefs and people of Uganda shall co-operate loyally with Her Majesty's Government"—
No, it was the Attorney-General who quoted it, but I must read it again— in the…administration of the said Kingdom of Buganda, Her Majesty's Government agrees to recognise the Kabaka of Buganda as the Native Ruler of the Province of Buganda under Her Majesty's protection and overrule.
The Kabaka had provided clear evidence of his intention no longer to co-operate with Her Majesty's Government and with the Protectorate Government in the administration of Buganda, and it was upon these grounds that we have been obliged reluctantly to withdraw recognition.
The individual issue at stake may be stated quite simply, but first, I must dispose of the suggestions that the crisis has arisen over the matter of federation. The words which I used—which still seem to me very vague—on 30th June at the East African dinner undoubtedly raised apprehension in the minds of the Kabaka and his Ministers and of the Lukiko. I therefore thought it necessary to give categorical assurances on this point, and I gave the Kabaka the assurances in the following terms with which, I fear, I must trouble the House:
1245Her Majesty's Government has no intention whatsoever of raising the issue of East African federation either at the present time or while local public opinion on this issue remains as it is at the present time.
Her Majesty's Government fully recognises that public opinion in the Protectorate generally and Buganda in particular, including the opinion of the Great Lukiko, would be opposed to the inclusion of the Uganda Protectorate in any such federation; Her Majesty's Government has no intention whatsoever of disregarding this opinion either now or at any time, and recognises accordingly that the inclusion of the Uganda Protectorate in any such federation is outside the realm of practical politics at the present time or while local public opinion remains as it is at the present time.
As regards the more distant future, Her Majesty's Government clearly cannot state now that the issue of East African federation will never be raised, since public opinion in the Protectorate, including that of the Baganda, might change, and it would not in any case be proper for Her Majesty's Government to make any statement now which might be Used at some time in the future to prevent effect being given to the wishes of the people of the Protectorate at that time.
But Her Majesty's Government can and does say that, unless there is a substantial change in public opinion in the Protectorate, including that of the Baganda, the inclusion of the Protectorate in an East African federation will remain outside the realm of practical politics even in the more distant future.
The Secretary of State is confident that you will agree that in this statement he has gone as far as he possibly can and has given you safeguards which cannot fail to be regarded as satisfactory.
What the hon. Members for Eton and Slough and Oldham, West forgot to mention was that at that time the Kabaka himself was entirely satisfied, and still remains entirely satisfied, with these assurances. That, I think, should dispose once and for all of the suggestion which was hinted at—in fact, stated categorically today—that the crisis which has led to the deposition of the Kabaka has anything to do with the question of federation; it has not.
After the Kabaka had expressed himself as satisfied with the assurances that I had given him on federation, there remained three points at issue. The first was that responsibility for the affairs of Buganda should be transferred to the Foreign Office. I explained that such an arrangement would be quite inappropriate, and although I do not think the Kabaka was satisfied with my reasons for rejecting the suggestion, he did not pursue the matter at the time and has
1246certainly not done so since. We were left then with but two points outstanding, but they concerned matters of such vital importance to the future of the Protectorate that failure to resolve them must inevitably lead to crisis. The first was the refusal of the Kabaka to co operate in the appointment of members to represent Buganda on the Legislative Council.
Perhaps I might for one moment turn aside to correct the hon. Member for Eton and Slough, whose facts were not correct when he gave the composition of the Legislative Council. There will not be 29 officials in the new Legislative Council, there will be 19 or 20. The balance of the Government side will be made up by a cross-bench—eight or nine members—composed of the chairmen of the statutory boards and of prominent members of the public, including Africans.
The members of the cross-bench are free to vote and speak as they like, except on a three-line Whip. This is the creation of Sir Andrew Cohen's ingenious and liberal mind, and this proposal for the new Legislative Council was as far as he wished to go and received my approval at the time he put the proposals forward. I thought it as well to correct the hon. Gentleman on these rather vital points, on which he was so much astray.
Under the new Constitution which is to be introduced early next year, there are to be three Baganda members, and the intention was that as in the past the Kabaka should put forward names for the approval of the Governor. He made clear that far from nominating members, he would actively oppose the appointment even directly by the Governor, of any Baganda members at all. Thus Uganda would have been left without representation, and when matters vitally affecting the interests and well-being of the people of Buganda were being discussed in the Legislative Council, they themselves would have been left without the means of voicing their opinions or their desires.
This was a serious, indeed it was a critical matter for the Baganda but, when I turn, as I must, to the demands that Buganda should be made an independent State—a demand which the Kabaka has
1247not withdrawn, but has continually repeated—the House will see that the whole future of the Protectorate of Uganda is involved. I would go further and say that the whole future of Uganda is manaced.
It is necessary for me at this point to touch quite a bit on the background against which I say this. The House remembers that there are four provinces in Uganda—North, East, West and Buganda itself. The Western Province includes three native States with separate, but similar agreements, referred to generally as Agreement States. Buganda is also a native State, but is much the largest in the country. It comprises about 17,000 square miles out of the 80,000 which is the area of Uganda and it has over 1,300,000 inhabitants.
Regarding the relationship between the Baganda and the Protectorate as a whole, Article 3 of the Agreement of 1900 recites this: The Kingdom of Buganda in the administration of the Uganda Protectorate shall rank as a province of equal rank with any other provinces into which the Protectorate may be divided.
Clearly, it was the intention from the very beginning that Buganda should be an integral part of the Protectorate. Indeed, as recently as March this year the Kabaka publicly joined with the Governor in stating—and I quote:The Kingdom of Uganda will continue to go forward under the government of His Highness the Kabaka and play its part, in accordance with Article 3 of the Agreement, as a province and a component part of the Protectorate.
Thus, for more than 50 years, Buganda has been administered as a unitary State and, as everyone here knows, it has shown steady progress. That progress has been greatly accelerated in recent years and the progress applies equally to social, economic and political matters. All the efforts of the British Administration have been to make Uganda grow into a prosperous State with advancing political institutions. I must mention these things, because they are the things that are threatened by the present crisis.
On the political side, I need only refer to the enlargement of the Legislative Council, the development of local government, and the plan to hand over to the Buganda Government responsibility for
1248certain important services. These are proposals for which Sir Andrew Cohen has been responsible, and which I have approved. On the economic side—and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths), in many of these matters, has played a worthy part—there have been great advances.
Eight ginneries have been made available to the African co-operatives to gin their cotton. The Government are engaged in reorganising the coffee industry to give Africans an opportunity to play a part in the processing of their own crops. On the social side, a vastly expanded programme of education, which will cost no less than £10 million in the next eight years, has been initiated.
I am sure that it is not necessary to dwell very long upon the disastrous effect of trying to split up what is already a small enough country into smaller pieces. Buganda lies athwart the main lines of communication from the west to the east coast of Africa, which run up the Congo and the great lakes, through Buganda, and down to Mombasa. Every season there is large-scale migration of workers from the Congo to Kampala and the industries of the Eastern Province. I need not emphasise its key position athwart the communications.
Further, the Owen Falls power station lies astride the Victoria Nile, one end of the dam is in the Eastern Province and the other end of the dam and the power station are in Buganda. The commercial capital of Uganda is at Kampala, which is in Buganda. The political capital and the airfield are at Entebbe, also in the Province of Buganda. Both have grown up in the belief that Buganda would remain the geographical centre of the country and an integral part of the Protectorate. Kampala's commerce has close ties with Jinja in the Eastern Province, which is the chief port on Lake Victoria.
All the chief services of the Protectorate are centred in Kampala or Entebbe—Makerere University College, Mulago Training Hospital, and the main European and Asian hospitals, the Roman Catholic and Anglican cathedrals, Kampala Technical School, which is still being constructed, and the Community Development Centre at Entebbe, which is also under construction. I apologise for developing what I know most hon. Mem-
1249bers are familiar with, but, in short, the prosperity and expanding national life which I predict, and for which we should all work, would receive a fatal blow if Uganda were split up into more than one State.
Here is the crux of the whole matter. Could the Kabaka be allowed to state publicly that he intended to separate from the rest of Uganda? It was on this point chiefly that the discussions, with which I have been kept constantly in touch, took place between the Governor and the Kabaka. I want to go into some of the circumstances in order to rebut any ideas that hon. Members may be harbouring that these matters were hastily discussed and dismissed summarily.
As soon as I heard about this crisis I wondered whether I should fly out to Buganda, and I think the House would acquit me of any unwillingness to fly out to the scene of trouble, but I reflected very deeply whether I should use that particular method on this occasion. The Governor was very much against it, and I agreed with him. I reluctantly abandoned it. The reasons seemed to me then and still seem to me valid. They were that it would greatly increase the local tension if the Secretary of State went out and was known to be engaged in this kind of discussion. I therefore abandoned this course, though with some reluctance, but I know that that decision was right.
Then it occurred to me to consider whether it would be suitable to ask the Kabaka to fly here and have discussions with me. I wish to explain now why I rejected that alternative. If I had been successful in persuading the Kabaka to work with Her Majesty's Government and not against them, then, of course, all would have been well and the Kabaka could have returned and the tension would have rapidly disappeared. But supposing I had not been successful, what then? The Governor advised that in that event it was out of the question for the Kabaka, having openly set himself in opposition to Her Majesty's Government, to return to the territory without the gravest fears of civil disturbance.
The unanimous view of the Governor and all his advisers was that in that event we should risk a serious upheaval. In other words, if the Kabaka had not agreed I should have had to inform him in this country that he could not return to
1250Uganda. I considered that this would not be treating him fairly and that I must either give him a guarantee that he should return to Buganda, or that I should not ask him here. I thought that that was right. In short, I decided that the negotiations with the Kabaka must take place in Uganda, and must be conducted by the Governor.
It is unnecessary for me to tell hon. Members that in Sir Andrew Cohen who, when I first took office, was Head of the African Division of the Colonial Office and the Governor-designate of Uganda, we have a man with a long record of fruitful and enlightened work for Africans, a man of wide and liberal views and of outstanding ability and intellectual force. I reached the conclusion that if anyone was likely to persuade the Kabaka, it would be the Governor. Moreover, it was known to me that on some other occasions, before I took office, when the Kabaka was in minor disagreement with the Colonial Office, Sir Andrew Cohen had acted in the most friendly manner to the Kabaka, and had conducted the negotiations with marked success.
I think that this disposes of the suggestion that these negotiations were quickly and brusquely dealt with. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Governor had six long interviews with the Kabaka. He first saw him on 27th October, then on 29th October, again on 3rd November, again on 6th November, again on 27th November, and for the sixth time on 30th November. I became increasingly concerned at the obdurate nature of the Kabaka's opposition, which had persisted and, indeed, had become more pronounced during these five weeks of discussion, and before his meeting on Friday last I sent an urgent telegram to the Governor.
In that telegram I told the Governor that—and these are the actual words—as "a high matter of policy" the Kabaka should be persuaded to comply with his obligations under the Agreement and that he should be persuaded not to withdraw from the very clear position that he had taken up in March. I said, in that telegram, that I relied upon the Governor to use once more his very best endeavours to persuade the Kabaka to respond to my appeal. At the same time, as the House knows, I sent the Kabaka a personal message which I circulated on Monday in the Official Report.
1251I next laid down the procedure, to which the Governor agreed, and I told him that on no account was he to take no for an answer at the meeting of last Friday but should give the Kabaka my personal message, together with any arguments which he thought suitable at that time. He should then allow a period of two or three days to elapse, and it was only then, if the Kabaka persisted in his refusal, this extreme step should be taken. Before he set in motion the machinery for the final act he told the Kabaka specifically that his persistence in his attitude would involve a breach of the Agreement and would entitle Her Majesty's Government to withdraw recognition.
The Governor asked the Kabaka whether he understood this and he replied that he did. All our efforts to persuade the Kabaka failed, but I can tell the House with absolute sincerity that nothing was left undone which might have induced the Kabaka to repent of the errors of his ways and take his proper part in the development, both of his own territory and its inhabitants, and of Uganda as a whole.
It remains for me to inform the House, briefly, of events since the Kabaka left Uganda. Yesterday, the Katikiro—that is the Prime Minister of Buganda—broadcast to the people of Buganda and called upon them to remain calm. This, according to my reports, they have done and the Governor has told me that he does not expect any trouble at the present time. The Katikiro also informed them that the meeting of the Lukiko would be held today. I have not received a telegraphic report of that meeting, but I understand from the Governor—whom I telephoned about half-past one this afternoon—that the Lukiko wished to send a delegation to meet me in London. I will be ready to see them.
This morning I had a long talk with the Kabaka. I did not wish to press him into further discussion of political matters beyond what he wished to say himself. He was alone, and he feels severely the loss of his sister, which I am sure the whole House deplores. This conversation could not have been more friendly. It was extremely painful to me because of the dignified and correct bearing of the Kabaka in all these matters. It was the
1252more painful to me because he was a member of my university and of my regiment, and a friend of my son's at Cambridge. I was able to assure him that no personal matters arose at all, but that I had a clear duty in these matters which, however painful, I must fulfil. In that conversation it was made clear to me that the Kabaka fully understood the nature of the two issues upon which this action had had to be taken and that no compromise compatible with my duties was possible.
It remains my unshakeable belief that the people of Buganda and the other peoples of the provinces of the Protectorate could not achieve that political, social and economic progress to which they aspire and for which the Governor has done such notable work unless the unity of the Protectorate was maintained, preserved and proclaimed at this moment. Unfortunately, the proposals of the Kabaka were in direct contradiction to that aim. He wishes to divide Buganda. In the past, it has sometimes been a jibe against the British, as against the Roman Empire, that their motto was "Divide and rule." In this case, as in that of Nigeria, our object is to maintain and knit together a unitary State.
I conclude by saying once more that the personal aspect of this affair is particularly painful. The action which was taken has not been taken with any haste. In fact, it has been delayed until every opportunity had been given to the Kabaka to revise and reverse his decision. We have, I believe, acted rightly and we have certainly been moved by one guiding principle, that of our desire to secure the continued advancement of all the peoples of the Protectorate, including, not least, the people of Buganda itself.
Idil Amin was president of Uanda( 1971-79)See how his admirers measure transformation; YKM is supposed to be better because UPDF is more people friendly. Or he has allowed this or that or that people can at least sleep.
Idil Amin was president of Uanda( 1971-79)
