Showing posts with label SALIM SALEH. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SALIM SALEH. Show all posts

Tuesday, 6 March 2012

READ THESE DOCUMENTS DURING YOUR LEISURE TIME

Documents(part 1)

Kunyaza or Kakyabali
Bamwine Ruling pg 1-9
Bamwine DP Ruling pg 10-17
The Citizenship Immigrtion Act
FDCPC MANIFESTO
1.cohen’s speech
2. BORN AGAIN BUGANDA
3. FDC STRATEGIC PLAN 2007[1]
4. MAP OF BUNYORO AND BUGANDA BEFORE 1896
5. Land Transfe Form(Real one)
6. MORE 1980-84 UGANDA MURDERS
7. MUBENDE-BANYORO MEMORANDUM ON LOST COUNTIES
8. MUSEVENI Buganda-riots SPEECH
9. PROF LULE SPEECH TO NCC
10. UGANDA DEFENCE WHITE PAPER
11. UPDF ACT 2005
12.WHAT IS UGANDANS AT HEART
13.Dr.Ssemogerere’s letter to Paulo Muwanga
14.TOP SECRET UNDER PROTECTORATE GOVERNMENT
15.Uganda cabinet before Amin take over
16.UNLA REVENGE ON WEST+NILE
17.UPC AND BANYARWANDA
18. UPC AND BANYARWANDA 2
19.REVENGE ON WEST NILE+FOOTNOTES
20.MUSEVENI SUPPORTS VIOLENCE AND DR. FANON
21. ADDITIONAL+IMAGES+OF+MIGINGO
22.GEOGRAPHY OF MIGINGO ZONE
23.National Development plan
24. DRC_REPPORT_FINAL_ENG_18062010-2[1]
25.
History of Cooperatives In Uganda
26. KUNYANZA OR KAKYABALI
27. Kutesa bribes
28. uncensored-competition-commission-report-on-banking[2]
29. Omulangira_Ssemakokiro
30. COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS by GENERAL SALIM SALEH
31. A Study of Uganda’s Radio Impact
32. Brazilian Football and Globalization
33. Gordon Brown as prime minister
34. GROOMING, GOSSIP, FACEBOOK AND MYSPACE
35. NUBIANS OF EAST AFRICA
36. Race, Post-Black Politics, and the Democratic Presidential Candidacy of Barack Obama
37. UGANDA’S AGRICULTURAL POLICY
38. THE_ACHOLI_QUESTION by General Salim Saelh
39. Budo Riots 1942


Documents(part 2)

  1. !st+Republic+Of+Uganda+Cabinet+as+of+December+1970[1]
  2. 1980-84 UGANDA MURDERS
  3. ACHOLI+UNLA+MURDERS+LETTER
  4. AMMENDMENTS+TO+THE+LAND+ACT+AMDMNT+BILL%2C+2007
  5. Assistance Request Form
  6. BUGANDA NATIONAL DRESS PRECOLONIAL
  7. BUGANDA+AGREEMENT+1961+PT1
  8. CHEEYE JUDGEMENT
  9. KASANJE-NAKAWUKA KILLINGS
  10. KAYIIRA MURDER REPORT DP VERSION
  11. MENGO REBUTTAL ON AKENDA
  12. MUWANGA PROCLAMATION 8PM 11 DEC 1980
  13. OBOTE STRATEGY FOR 1980 ELECTIONS
  14. REPORT ON THE THE MURDER OF DR ANDREW KAYIIRA
  15. UN REPORT ON UGANDA
  16. Museveni’s Speech- state of nation address 2011
  17. Indictment of Gilbert Bukenya(Former VP of Uganda)
  18. uganda oil, Uganda Economy,history and donors
  19. uganda North American Association lega document
  20. Letter to SA Parliament_Uganda at Crossroads_NP-1
  21. Men’s health
  22. UGANDA AGRIC. POLICY
  23. Uganda Agricultural Credit Facility
  24. Uganda World bank ATAAS PAD_May 17_2010 [1] posted by General Saleh
  25. Microfinance achievements under General Salim Saleh

Thursday, 23 February 2012

A BRIEF REPORT OF OUR EXPERIENCE WITH THE USE OF MUKENE –FORTIFIED MAIZE FLOOR AND DRIED MUKENE FISH POWDER SINCE 19th AUGUST 2010


We are grateful for the opportunity we have had to have a provision for nutritional support to some of our patients. We run a specialized HIV clinic at the Joint Clinical Research Centre and quite often we get both adults and children that need treatment for various HIV-related ailments but many of these patients present with malnutrition owing to a variety of reasons. Until recently, we have used “Plumpy–nut”, a ready to use therapeutic food (RTUF) which is peanut based as nutritional supplement particularly in the ambulant but malnourished children.

In August 2010, we received a donation of 2 food products from Akiba products limited. The larger of this consignment was maize floor fortified with Mukene fish powder in a ratio of 4:1 and the smaller consignment consisted of only Mukene fish powder.  Although we’d received information that the 2 food products were a rich source of calories, protein, minerals and vitamins, we were uncertain as to how these products would be received by our patients especially since this was the first time we used these food products and the majority of the recipients were children aged 2 to 10 years.

We decided to provide this food to the patients that were visibly malnourished and under weight. The main cause for the malnutrition in our population was food insecurity and insufficient knowledge on nutritious food preparation particularly for the children. In many instances of food insecurity, both the children and the care takers were malnourished. The care takers were asked about acceptability of fish by the children and they were initially given a small sample to prepare at home. When the child accepted the food then we increased the supply to 2 Kgs and 5Kgs depending on the ongoing need and acceptability. After a period of 1 to 2 months, the care takers later on gave us feed back of their experience with this food.

All the food recipients gained body weight of 0.5 to 1 Kg and none lost weight during that time. In most of the instances, the Mukene fortified maize flour was prepared as porridge and some of the children took a while to get used to the fish smell of the porridge but were very comfortable with it when prepared as a solid meal in a manner similar to the common Uganda dish of Ugali or posho. The unmixed Mukene fish powder was very popular because it could be mixed with any other food or sauce that the families had. To our surprise, some of them informed us they were already buying some Mukene flour but unlike those other similar products they had tried, this product had a fresh taste and was not bitter. Some care takers initially added herbal flavors like cinnamon, lemongrass and “Mujaaja”(a herb commonly added to tea in Kampala) to the porridge so as to improve acceptance by the children. Over 60 families have received these food products all have come back for more. The adults gained appetite and they report the children also to have gained appetite but we were unable to explain this finding. Many of the children got so much used to the porridge from the fortified flour and refused to revert to the plain maize porridge that they previously took before they received the fortified product.

There was one particular 8 year old total orphan on antiretroviral therapy and under the care of a grandmother, with food insecurity and very limited resources of her own and yet she was also looking after other orphans. This child had problems with adherence to treatment and was stunted. The clinic had supplied him with dried food rations e.g. posho, beans that were replenished on a weekly basis but without improvement. Eventually he was put on high protein-high RTUF popularly Known as “Plumpy nut” for close to 8 months until August 2010. The clinic staff made several home visits in attempts to improve his nutrition but without success and quite often he would be out competed for the food by the healthier children in the home. Because the fortified porridge was not comparable to the sweetness of the “Plumpy nut”, he didn’t receive as much competition for this food and was able to actually take all the food allocated to him and for the first time in many months, he was able to gain weight.

Because of the above clinical observations of weight gain among the children and the high acceptance rates of the families in need, we will greatly appreciate the chance to have the above food products (Mukene-Fortified maize floor and Mukene Fish powder) available in our clinic so that we can provide them to the children in need. This will lead to improved clinical outcomes as food supplementation to clients in need is an area where the clinic has been having challenges. 

 
Nutritional facts of maize flour, fish flour  & Fish enhanced maize flour (per 100g)












Maize flour (MF) Fish Flour (FF) MF Enhanced with FF
Calorie content of Food   (Kcals) 342 333.2 344.2
Protein content   (g)                  8.48 75.7 15.58
Fat content (lipids)      (g)          1.65 2.9 1.85
Carbohydrate content    (g)       77.68 Not Measured 77.9
Dietary Fiber content     (g)        7.4 Not Measured 7.6








Minerals Nutrition in maize flour 










Calcium (Ca) content       (mg)           4 70 9.3
Iron (Fe) content      (mg)                   0.52 1.9 1.1
Magnesium (Mg) content      (mg)     37 139 49.5
Phosphorus (P) content        (mg)      90 800 131.2
Potassium (K) content        (mg)       162 1391 184.9
Sodium (Na) content          (mg)            3 335 27.7
Zinc (Zn) content                (mg)        0.72 2.2 0.82








Vitamins Nutrition in maize flour 










Vitamin C   (mg)          
7.3 6.1 7.35
vitamin B-1  (mg)
0.0254 0.2 0.1
vitamin B-2  (mg)
0.085 0.3 0.1
Vitamin B-6 (mg)                 0.071 1.1 0.2
Folic Acid content (µg)      1.85 29 5.1

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
















Nutritional facts of mukene (fish) flour (per 100g)











Mukene Flour 

Calorie content of Food   (Kcals) 333.2

Protein content   (g)                  75.7

Fat content (lipids)      (g)          2.9








Minerals Nutrition










Calcium (Ca) content       (mg)           70

Iron (Fe) content      (mg)                   1.9

Magnesium (Mg) content      (mg)     139

Phosphorus (P) content        (mg)      800

Potassium (K) content        (mg)       1391

Sodium (Na) content          (mg)            335

Zinc (Zn) content                (mg)        2.2








Vitamins Nutrition 










Vitamin C   (mg)          
6.1

vitamin B-1  (mg)
0.2

vitamin B-2  (mg)
0.3

Vitamin B-6 (mg)                 1.1

Folic Acid content (µg)      29








 Gen.Caleb k Akandwanaho salim saleh oriba (rtd)
                  AKIBA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
                P O BOX 10508 KAMPALA UGANDA

Monday, 13 February 2012

Salim Saleh’s plan to address the ‘Acholi question’ and problems in Northern Uganda

Salim Saleh’s plan to address the ‘Acholi question’ and problems in Northern Uganda

 
 
 
 
 
 
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General Caleb akandwanaho salim saleh oriba (res)
By:Lt gen. Caleb akandwanaho salim saleh oriba (res)
Senior command and staff college kimaka
INTRODUCTION
  1. The Acholi question is, is it food security when the fighting stops or could food security stop the fighting.
Food Security means ensuring that all people have physical and economic access to the basic food they need to work and function normally. The right to food is the second most important human right after life. But in the Acholi region, the 17 year old Lords Resistance Army / Insurgency has affected peoples livelihood hence denying them the right to food. People have been forced to live in IDPs for fear of abduction and/or killings by the rebels.
This has left them no choice but to depend on donated food as and when the donors feel it necessary. Food security therefore is no longer a community responsibility as a normal in African culture but a gift from humanitarian agencies.

  1. Being agrarian community, food security is dependant on access to land, which unfortunately has been limited by insecurity and congestion within the camps hence raising the Acholi Question.
  2. According to H. Fritschel. Peace has broken out in a number of countries recently, raising hopes for establishing food security. But restoring food security after conflict can be complicated and dangerous. Whereas there is hardly any doubt that food security cannot arise under conflict conditions, it also follows that there can hardly be peace under food insecure conditions, A HUNGRY MAN IS AN ANGRY MAN.

AIM
  1. The aim of this paper is to examine an integrated solution to support food security in conflict areas. This will in turn build a momentum towards peaceful resolution of the conflict and development in the post conflict areas.



BACKGROUND
  1. Uganda has achieved remarkable economic and social achievements in the last fifteen years and is now ranked 146 out of 177 countries. This puts it ahead of Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania.

  1. In spite of the above-mentioned success, there are continued disparities in human well being especially in the Acholi sub region. This region is comprised of GULU, KITGUM AND PADER DISTRICTS. The estimated population is 1,048,207.

  1. Gulu district has an estimated population of 468,407, Kitgum has about 286,122 and Pader district has 293,679 people. It has been established that up to 87% of the population are displaced. An average camp is estimated to be one square mile with as many as 15,000 to 25,000 people. These are crammed in small huts with inadequate space and facilities.


  1. The appalling food insecurity has attracted both international and national strategies aimed at addressing the crisis. At the international level, the assistance is in the form of food aid and other services not related to food such as medicine, education and community activities.

  1. However, there is an acute shortage of basic facilities. There is dire need of a solution to the food insecurity situation that is not dependant on relief food delivered by NGOs and international UN agencies.

  1. The supply of food and other aid is not guaranteed because World Food Programme and other agencies are severely limited in their delivery of food and other humanitarian assistance by the high risk of attacks on road convoys. Travel on most roads is possible with armed escorts.

  1. The assistance to the IDPs is slow, poorly organized and to a great degree inefficient. The money allocated is badly distributed. Frequently the materials provided for purposes of relief are not adapted to the requirements of the people in the local conditions.

  1. In many cases those who come to the assistance of the sufferers lack the expert knowledge of the technique of relief work. The offerings made by the governments of the countries, which are safe to those affected, are in the nature of charitable donations, which tend to embarrass the givers and humiliate the recipients.

  1. Academics, consultants and specialists, journalists including conflict resolution experts who are never neutral mainly run the relief agencies. In relation to the on-going conflict relief assistance has an impact. The mere fact of keeping people alive in an internal conflict is political and deserves to be recognized as such. Perhaps the most common subversive impact of foreign relief programmes is that they invite favorable comparison with government’s own effort thus undermining the legitimacy of the government.

  1. Any established aid programme creates a local constituency to defend it. As programmes become entrenched they tend to become more conservative and as the donor agency invests more it becomes less willing to change even in obvious cases of wrong priorities. The agency or NGO most determined to get the highest media profile obtains most funds from governments and donors. In doing so it prioritizes the requirements for fundraising. It follows the TV camera, employs young women to appear in the field with graphic and emotive shots of starving kids and helpless women. Here the definition of what the problem is becomes political and bad blood starts flowing between the government and relief agencies.

  1. More importantly according to Alex da Wadl (Famine crimes), in a prolonged aid programme, cultural shifts occur in recipient communities. Aid donors increasingly come to define the problems and solutions to the recipient country and their dominant position in major policy debates undermines the country’s possibility to conduct its own domestic debates on the issues. The danger her is that national opinion formers may get over influenced by the perceptions and prescriptions of the donors’ role of aid and the charitable approach at the expense of local policy related and political solutions.

  1. The end result is that the recipient communities come to believe that solutions lie entirely in the hands of the aid agencies and not in their own actions. This level of demoralization and dependency is perhaps the most difficult obstacle to overcome in post conflict period. Some form of support in farming and other economic activities needs to be encouraged.
All this shows that when a government assumes that NGOs can plan and implement food security programmes for the people of the Acholi sub-region, it is assuming the impossible.
That is why the government has to realize that it needs to draw up and fulfill “a Social Economic Contract” to ensure food security for the people in the Acholi sub-region in spite of the conflict.

  1. If we go by the poverty eradication plan, it is clear that the link between security, good governance and development is well addressed. For example, first and foremost in an agriculturally dependent economy like Uganda, one cannot address economic growth in a sustainable manner without modernizing agriculture.
Secondly, good governance and security are crucial to agriculture. Any other intervention to increase the abilities of the poor to raise income and improving the quality of life is definitely correct. However, PEAP remains a broad plan. It does not focus on any specific target community such as that affected by conflict.

For that matter it remains largely within the general national and local government policy and extension services that are already crippled in the context of Acholi.



EARLIER GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS IN INTERVENTION

  1. In the 1990 the government tried to implement special programmes like the Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme NURP I. This programme would have compensated the damage caused by the insurgencies and cattle rustling. The aim was to restore basic social economic infrastructure as well as revive income-generating activities after what seemed like the end of the war. This effort was undermined by sporadic insecurity.
Furthermore, centralized procedures led to poor performance, inefficiency and resource wastages especially during procurement.

  1. Lack of ownership of the programmes among the people also impeded the full implementation of the intervention. NURP II was later conceived to compliment NURP I and sought to promote a transition from conflict to peace in the Acholi sub-region and Northern Uganda as a whole. It was also supposed to consolidate the gains if any achieved under NURP I.
NURP II was also supposed to avoid mistakes that caused NURP I to fail. Unfortunately this programme never delivered the expected results. In total about 150 million dollars was spent but to date one cannot point to any outcome of this colossal sum of money. If someone is over flying the area in question, the only evidence that this programme existed is abandoned modern school buildings scattered all over the place.

  1. Currently another programme is under way at an estimated cost of 93,000,000 US dollars. It is known as Northern Uganda Social Action Fund. Among other things it is supposed to carry out restocking and capacitate the youth to generate income. The programme is also supposed to address other factors caused by the bad performance of NURP 1and NURP II. Despite these interventions and resource flows, and food insecurity and poverty in this regime remains high. The intervention undertaken and the resource spent have failed to make any significant difference in peoples’ lives. So why have these enormous interventions failed to deliver food security?

  1. There can only be two reasons for failure to achieve the set targets of the programmes already mentioned. Either the gravity of the poverty problem in Acholi land is so deep that the interventions and resources spent so far are inadequate to make any significant difference to the lives of the people or the intervention undertaken by the government and its development partners and sect oral and district level are not appropriately designed and implemented to deliver services effectively in conflict situations.

  1. I tend to agree with the latter in that as a result of inadequate understanding and appreciation of the complexities of the Acholi conflict by implementers, policy makers and development partners, insufficient attention is paid to potential solutions to the local challenges. The breakdown of governance structures, low absorptive capacity and lack of accurate information abut the most appropriate ways of delivering food security may be contributory factors that slow down implementation of the interventions.
Also centralized procedures, top-down approach and sporadic insecurity created new needs and caused delays in the execution of the planned activities.

  1. Lastly the government has never considered food security as one of the items of strategic importance. That is why it was left entirely in the hands of the relief agencies and development partners. If government could realize the relationship between food security and insurgency then appropriate means would be availed to deal with it in a more logical, consistent and planned manner.

CONCLUSION

  1. The need for food security is a challenge that requires new tools and wider partnerships. As Prof. Asenath Sigot put it, unless communities, regions and local counterparts get convinced of the validity, importance and priority of concerning themselves with food security, then no amount of pushing will give rise to authentic let alone responses that are effective.

As for the Acholi question, I want us to look at the following calculations.
a)       The amount of money used in relief operations over the years including the said interventions. This is approximately 500,000,000 US$.
b)       Amount of land available for emergency production is over 2 million acres.
c)        The number of people displaced is approximately 200,000 families.
d)       If each family had been assisted to plough, plant and harvest 3 acres of land, the entire displaced population would have needed 600,000 acres of prepared and defended land.
e)        That would have cost government approximately US$150,000,000 and you cannot compare that with the US$500,000,000 already spent.

  1. From the above-mentioned calculations, I beg to conclude that food security could stop the fighting.




RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. It is recommended that local communities should be given the opportunity to prepare their own strategies for self-sufficiency in food security. An enabling environment will allow people in the communities to express their views on the issues. They will be capable of defining their needs and aspirations and formulating a plan for sustainable food security. To attain food security is a matter of responsible, informed behavior by individuals and groups. Responsible behavior is likely only when people have full control over their lives and access to resources they require. Strengthening self-reliance communities have to be empowered to act in their own interest in order to develop a strong sense of identity, mobilization of under-utilized skills and resources to liberate the emergency of community work, innovate and diversify their livelihood. Finally efficient use of human and material resources.

  1. Government should carry out a comprehensive cross-sect oral and integrated approach to food security in the Acholi region in particular and Uganda at large. This should involve a wider range of people in and out of government to develop food security action plans. Experts should be nationals of the country charged with the task to develop a checklist of priority actions that will provide guidelines for sustainable food security.

  1. The issue of land holding should be resolved

  1. The acholi people have been traumatized but should not be blind of the fact that it is they who could develop them selves.

  1. Gulu airport should be upgraded to an international standard.
Dec 2005.
REFERENCES
  1. Gulu Food Security assessment: Understanding vulnerability in the Gulu context.
  2. Emergency food needs assessment report for Kitgum, Gulu and Pader districts – October 2003.
  3. Security and production programme May 2003.
  4. Farmer assisted agricultural programme.
  5. Conflict and hunger research report – prepared by the Office of the Prime Minister.
  6. Past conflict reconstruction. Ministry of Finance. THE case of Northern Uganda.
  7. Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa. The role of government and NGO by Prof. Assenath Sigot.
  8. Our task: The question of security and governance by George Kent.
  9. Famine Crimes by Alex de Waal.
  10. Interventions and sanctions by Sir W R Harcout in 1843.

Tuesday, 7 February 2012

Presentation on the perfomance of the financial sector for the last 20 years



1.      Introduction
The late 1970’s and the early 1980’s saw Uganda suffer from several constraints in terms of overall growth of the economy and macroeconomic stability. In particular, the heavy indebtedness, negative growth, double –digit inflation, terms of trade shocks, rising current account and budget deficits and declining reserves were key outcomes of the poor economic policies and the exogenous shocks the country faced. However, the situation was reversed starting in the late 1980’s with the country experiencing steady improvement in macroeconomic performance with a rebound in growth through the 1990’s and steady declines in inflation from the earlier levels. The fiscal deficits were reduced and the donor funding and debt forgiveness helped to increase international reserves. This note reviews the economic performance during the last 20 years.

2.      Macroeconomic and structural policies
The principal objective of the government over the last 20 years was sustaining high and broad based growth. The emphasis was placed on poverty reduction through facilitation of poor people’s participation and benefit from increased economic activity. The strategy followed involved maintaining macroeconomic stability through appropriate tight fiscal and monetary policy; liberalization of the economy to promote private sector led growth and improved external sector performance and implementation of structural and institutional reforms to reduce the constraints to growth.

Fiscal reforms: These centered on improvements to tax administration to boost revenues and introduction of expenditure controls especially to reduce the accumulation of new arrears. On the later a system of monitoring commitments made by line ministries to ensure consistence with budgetary provisions and cash releases was instituted. However, government objective of improving health, education and infrastructure also meant that government had to increase the outlays in these areas. Consequently, the large part of the fiscal consolidation measures centered on tax actions taken that included the creation of the URA, introduction of discretionary tax measures and replacement of sales and commercial transactions levy tax with Value Added Tax. The URA was later restructured to improve tax administration with specific improvements to the audit section and the URA statute revised. Other measures involved broadening the tax base and improving the collection rate.

Financial sector reforms: A number of legal and regulatory reforms were pursued including revisions to the Bank of Uganda Act, enactment of the Financial Institutions Act and the MDI Act. BOU was recapitalized and several weak banks restructured. The country’s largest Bank (UCB) was privatized and to avoid stretching the Bank of Uganda’s Supervision capacity, a moratorium on bank licensing was instituted. Improvements in banking supervision to help banks ensure better risk management were pursued and BOU’s capacity to better regulate non-banks was improved especially following the enactment of the MDI Act. More recently the moratorium on new bank licensing was removed allowing the entry of several new banks to encourage competition as well as to foster the reduction in the intermediation spread.  Interest rates determination was decontrolled and left to the market participants. However, the spread between the lending rates remained high partly due to low response to the BOU’s signaling rates and non-performing loans. The BOU also broadened and deepened the government securities market through introduction of more long term dated instruments and development of the secondary market.



Liberalization and external sector policies: Government eliminated marketing boards, price controls, and export taxes and exchange restrictions. The current and capital account controls were removed paving way for the expansion and diversification of the export base and encouraging non-debt creating capital inflows. This was also partly encouraged by the lowering of import tariffs and the streamlining of the duty draw back system on exports.  The exchange rate became market determined with BOU maintaining presence in the market by way of intervening whenever necessary to smooth volatility while mindful of the international reserves and inflation objective. A new foreign exchange statute was enacted and new reporting requirements were introduced to improve balance of payments compilation.

Structural reforms: These focused on improvements to the quality and coverage of infrastructure services by increasing competition and private sector participation and improving the legal and regulatory framework for power, telecommunications, water, railway, posts and aviation. Individual regulatory agencies were created under each line ministry to implement related reforms to ensure that the intended overall objectives of improved coverage and quality are achieved. On infrastructure government with the support of donors spent substantial amounts on the rehabilitation of the road network in the initial 10 year period (1991 to 2000) and has during the last five years commenced expansion of existing major corridors and upgrading of other important roads across the country. A roads Authority (Uganda National Roads Authority) responsible for developing and maintaining national roadwork’s was also set-up. Electricity is being addressed through construction of a large hydro power plant at Bujagali and encouragement of private sector supply to the main grid. Temporary thermal was also set-up to fill the void that was created by reduction of supply at the main hydro power plant and increased demand. Besides road and electricity infrastructure, government also developed schools and health facilities country-wide. Further, legislative and judicial reforms supportive of private sector investment and economic activity were implemented. Social expenditures with a view to building human capital, primarily through improved access to education and health services; and pursuing good governance as building blocks for reducing poverty through economic growth and human and physical resource development were also persued.

3.      Macroeconomic Performance in the last 20 years

Real GDP grew at an annual average of 7% between 1991 and 2000, and accelerated to an average of 7.6% after 2000 as the sector composition changed. Overall, the economy underwent transformation from a predominantly agricultural based economy towards a service sector based economy. The share of value addition in agriculture to output fell from an average of 45% between 1991 and 2000 to an average of 25%, while value addition in services increased from the average of 38% to an average of 50% over the same period. Value addition in industry also grew from a share of 16% to 25% of GDP.  Within the services sector, growth was mainly in construction and communication. The changing composition was partly due to increase in investment (gross fixed capital formation increased at an annual average of 7% between 1991 and 2000, and rose to average of 11% between 2001 and 2009). As a share of GDP, gross fixed capital formation increased from an annual average of 17% of GDP between 1991 and 2000 to an annual average of 21% of GDP between 2001 and 1009. The increase in investment after drastic declines prior to the 1990’s was on account of rehabilitation of infrastructure and increase in productive capacity.


Inflation which was in double digits at the start of the 1990’s (about 30%) continued to fall and was maintained at an average of 5% over the 13 year period between 1995 and 2007. However, inflation hit double digits in 2008 and 2009 on the back of rising oil prices and other commodity prices as well as adverse weather conditions. Much of the decrease in inflation can be explained by fiscal and monetary developments. The fiscal deficit (excluding grants) averaged at about 5% of GDP in the late 1990’s, from a history of high levels. However, there was a three year period (2001 to 2003) when the deficits rose significantly to an average of 11% before reverting to the previous low levels of about 5% of GDP. In the three years that the deficit excluding grants hit double digit levels, government expenditures increased to an average of 22% of GDP from previous levels of about 15% of GDP. Revenues on the other hand have consistently risen doubling in the early 1990’s to an average of 10% of GDP and rising further to an average of 13% of GDP towards the end of the 2000’s.

At the monetary level, M2 grew rapidly at the start of the 1990’ (52%, 66%, and 57% in 1991, 1992 and 1993) before gradually declining to an average annual growth of 17% between 1995 and 2000. The average growth was 19% between 2001 and 2009 but was characterized by surges in 2002, 2007 and 2008 to 25%, 22% and 31% annual growth rates respectively. As a share of GDP, there was an increase from the average of 11.4% between 1991 and 2000 to the average share of 18% between 2001 and 2008. Despite the growth in the monetary aggregates, BOU’s stance remained largely non-accommodative as most of the growth in the monetary aggregates was up until 2007 due to increases in the international reserves. International reserves increased rapidly from 1 month of import cover of goods and services in 1991 to 6 months by the middle of the period (2000) and was maintained at that level through 2009. On the other hand, domestic credit to the private sector increased as a share of GDP from the average of 4.5% between 1991 and 2000 to an average of 10% between 2001 and 2008. Despite the increase in domestic credit to the private sector, lending rates remained largely unchanged at about 20% for the period between 1995 and 2009. However, some increase was initially registered in the savings rate to about 11% in 1997 and 1998 but fell following the bank closures and improved risk management of banks to about 9% to offset some of the increased running costs.

The external sector performance was characterized by mixed fortunes during the period 1991 to 2009. In the current account, the annual growth in exports of goods and services rose rapidly starting in the mid 1990’s averaging 20% on the back of the successful export diversification policies following the implementation of the liberalization and benefits of the bumper coffee harvests and favorable international prices. The gradual fall in international prices that followed resulted in the halving of the growth rates for exports of goods and services in the period between 2001 and 2007 to about 10% per annum before rising again on the back of increased regional demand for Ugandan products as peace was restored in South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo. In the capital account, Uganda was a major beneficiary of HIPC debt relief which significantly reduced outflows for debt repayment and also resulted in scaling up of donor resources for poverty programs during the 1990’s and first half of 2000. The additional debt forgiveness through the MDRI provided further savings of foreign exchange that would otherwise have been spent on servicing debt. In the private sector, foreign direct investment equally grew rapidly, from a share of GDP of 0% at the start of the 1990’s to 2% between 1995 and 2000 and doubled to 4% between 2001 and 2009. These developments in the balance of payments supported the slow and steady depreciation in the exchange rate in nominal terms over the last two decades averaging 5% per annum, and the stability in the real effective exchange rate which averaged an annual change over the entire period of 0%.

The outcome of the macroeconomic and structural policies can be seen in the steady decline in the head count poverty indicator from 39% in 2002/03 to 31% in 2005/06 to 24.5% in 2009/10. The key improvements have been noted in education and living arrangements although the incidence of poverty is still high in rural areas and inequality has worsened.

4.      Outlook
Going forward, there is need to raise growth back to its potential following the recent slowdown to ensure that the MDG’s are met. Efforts to address lingering infrastructure bottlenecks and speeding up of oil production offer potential for boosting growth over the medium to long term. In particular, improvements in infrastructure could support the transformation of the agricultural sector offering prospects for not only reducing poverty levels but also lowering income inequalities between rural and urban populations. The outlook for inflation is favorable but caution is needed to ensure that the transient increase in fiscal spending during the election period coupled with mixed revenue performance and the exchange rate depreciation does not feed through into prices. The accommodative monetary stance that was taken in the wake of the global financial crisis to buttress aggregate demand will need to be discontinued in view of the inflation momentum that has been observed in the most recent months.

Previous delays in budget execution appear to have been moderated over the recent months. The improvements will however need to be backed by improvements in the quality of expenditures focusing on fine-tuning of project appraisal and implementation. In particular, enforcement of government’s control measures and ensuring of compliance by spending units will be critical for ensuring value for money from implemented projects.  Additional gains in revenue effort will also be required to match government desires in expanding expenditures to address the remaining infrastructure needs and expanding public service. Moreover, the expected revenues from oil when production commences may lower the potential expansion of non-oil revenues which calls for urgent boosting of revenue effort in the near term. In addition, the possibility to operationalise public private partnership ventures for some infrastructure investment will need to be considered.

The external sector will need much support to reverse recent widening of the current account due to sluggish global demand for Uganda’s exports and the boosting of aggregate demand in the economy through recent expansionary fiscal policy at a time when private sector demand has been rising. The deterioration in the current account which is mirrored in the rapid depreciation of the shilling also calls for expanding the country’s export sector to tap into the countries agricultural potential to serve regional demand and the tourism sector which still has some unexploited/underexploited opportunities.  There will be need to harness benefits from the regional integration efforts under the EAC. Existing opportunities in the service sector particularly in the education and health sectors will need to be used to maximize benefits from the integration efforts.

Thank you LK
SO HOW DO WE TAP INTO THE AGRICULTURE POTENTIAL?
THE AKIBA PLAN.
24-1-2011




THE AKIBA PLAN

  1. IDENTIFY LAND OWNERS
  2. IDENTIFY SUITABLE ENTERPRISE
  3. IDENTIFY IN /OUTPUT  CONTRACTORS
  4. IDENTIFY DISTRIBUTORS
  5. IDENTIFY CONSUMERS
POSTED BY:
Gen.Caleb k Akandwanaho salim saleh oriba (rtd)
                  AKIBA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
                P O BOX 10508 KAMPALA UGANDA