FDC is not that different from NRM

by Yoga Adhola.
The passion and vigour with which Dr Besigye attacks Museveni and the NRM may lead one to think major differences exist between FDC and NRM; however, a closer look will reveal there are really no serious ideological differences.
If any differences exist at all, they emanate from the fact that Museveni has been President and Dr Besigye and General Mugisha Muntu have not. Being President placed Museveni face to face with reality and so forced him to discard the illusions he had embraced during the bush war.
There are two ways of transcending illusions. One, is theoretically i.e. by studying and reaching a point of realising that a belief that one holds is an illusion. The other way is by practice i.e. going through an experience and realisng that whatever one believes in does not work.
Just like Museveni who could not realise that his bush war ideas were illusionary, and had to become President before that realisation, both Dr Besigye and General Muntu are not capable of theoretically transcending the ideas they embraced during the bush war. they can only transcend those ideas through practice.
They still believe the ideas behind the bush war were correct but Museveni abandoned the correct path the NRM was on when he (Museveni) became President. Dr Besigye has said this numerous times.
When Museveni and the NRAs were in the bush they embraced the illusion that they were fighting to bring about a Cuban-type revolution in Uganda.many of them may not admit to this today, but this is what they preached to each other.
It is Salim Salleh who once gave a clear exposition of this aim. In The Monitor of Wednesday, November, 2006 Salim Salleh clearly stated and I quote:
“A small group of fighters, with 27 guns, without external assistance for much of the time and without a rear base in any neighbouring country, defeating a government that had a force of almost 60,000 soldiers in a record time of five years, is almost un-paralleled in the history of revolutionary warfare.
The only similar case in the world is that of Fidel Castro in Cuba. After the initial setback of losing most of his fighters to the Batista Airforce, he gathered 12 survivors with whom he headed to the Sierra Maestra Mountains from where he, eventually, defeated the dictatorship.”
President Museveni also betrayed this motive a bit in January 1986 when being sworn in as President. At that he said they were bringing in a “fundamental change” by which he meant revolution. Incidentally the Cuban revolution used to refer to their revolution as a “fundamental change”.
While talking about carrying out a revolution in Uganda, the strategists and ideologues of the NRA did not realise is that a revolution only occurs when the specific circumstances obtains. these circumstances are called a revolutionary situation and they were well-defined by the famous revolutionary Lenin.
According to Lenin “….it is indisputable that a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation; furthermore, it is not every revolutionary situation that leads to revolution. What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a revolutionary situation?
We shall certainly not be mistaken if we indicate the following three major symptoms: (1) when it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the “upper classes”, a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for “the lower classes not to want” to live in the old way; it is also necessary that “the upper classes should be unable” to live in the old way; (2) when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual; (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in “peace time”, but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis and by the “upper classes” themselves into independent historical action.
Without these objective changes, which are independent of the will, not only of individual groups and parties but even of individual classes, a revolution, as a general rule, is impossible. The totality of all these objective changes is called a revolutionary situation.”
The situation Lenin is talking about did not obtain in Uganda in the 80s when Museveni and his NRA were waging their so-called war of liberation. because of that deficiency, when they arrived in power in 1986, they faced the situation which another famous revolutionary, Fredrick Engels once described thus:
“The worst thing that can befall a leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to take over government when the movement is not yet ripe for the domination of the class which he represents and for the realisation of the measures which that domination would imply.
What he can do depends not upon his will but upon the sharpness of the clash between the various classes, and upon the degree of development of material means of existence, the relations of production and the means of communication upon which the clash of interests of classes is based every time.What he ought to do, what his party demands of him, again depeneds not upon him, or upon the degree of development of the class struggle and its conditions
Thus he necessarily finds himself in a dilemma. What he can do is in contrast to all his actions as hitherto practised, to all his principles and to the present interests of the party; what he ought to do cannot be achieved. In a word, he is compelled to represent not his party or class but the class for whom conditions are ripe for domination.
In the interests of the movement itself, he is compelled to defend the interests of an alien class, and to feed his own class with phrases and promises, with the assertion that the interests of that alien class are their own interests.
Whoever puts himself in this awkward position is irrevocably lost. We have seen examples of this in recent times. We need only be reminded of the position taken in the last French provisional government by the representatives of the proletariat, though they represented only a very low level of proletarian development.
Whoever can still look forward to official positions after having become familiar with the experiences of the February government — not to speak of our own noble German provisional governments and imperial regencies — is either foolish beyond measure, or at best pays only lip service to the extreme revolutionary party. ”
In power Museveni soon realised what Engels is saying. He had not made a revolution in Uganda; in stead, he had made a fool of himself. He shed off the illusions of “fundamental change” or revolution and adjusted to reality. This is what Dr Besigye calls abandoning the course of struggle.
The very fits taste of reality was the budget of 1986. Under the illusions that they were revolutionaries and Uganda under their leadership was not a neo-colony subject to IMF superintendence, they thought they could circumvent the IMF.
To this effect they drew up a budget and gave it to the then Minister of Finance to take to Washington, DC to the IMF. IN Washington, DC Dr Kiyonga was told in no uncertain language that the budget was unacceptable. the IMF team then drew up a budget which was faxed to Uganda. the fax budget is then what constituted the budget.
Museveni and NRM were to meet a number of other setbacks and soon adjusted to working under the superintendence of imperialism. Over time they simply became puppets of imperialism.
In politics too Museveni had to make adjustment. The NRM (and the FDC too) does not represent any of the historically constituted grievances and aspirations of Uganda. That being the case the NRM (just like the FDC too) has no political or social base. Without a political/social base, the NRM had to resort to using the state to organise its politics.
It is such adjustments to reality which Dr Besigye and other members of the FDC who came from the NRM call abandoning the original course of the revolution; they don’t realise that Museveni had simply discarded illusions and adjusted to reality.
In Dr Besigye’s view Museveni should have continued prosecuting the illusion of the bush war days. Faced with this kind of mind-set, I am forced to conclude that Dr Besigye may need to become President of Uganda like Museveni in order for him to discard the bush war illusions. This is why I think there is not much difference between the FDC and NRM.
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Yoga Adhola is a former Editor-in-Chief of The People, newspaper of UPC and the party’s leading ideologue. He can be reached at yogaadhola@msn.com.

How to defeat Museveni and NRM by Timothy Mwaka

Many things have been said and done to try and bring about regime change in Uganda. From street protests to strikes but none of these has forced Museveni and his henchmen to move an inch or change and govern Uganda the way the citizens want. To make it worse, the opposition in Uganda remains as divided as ever. Hence for the first time I have decided to openly advice on how Ugandans can bring about change peacefully in Uganda.

There are 3 main principles that must be followed for a popular revolution to succeed. First, the opposition has to unite and form a coalition or a political alliance of opposition forces. But before this happens, they have to agree on the terms and conditions of what they can and cannot co-operate on. For example, one of the issues most political parties agree on is the need for federalism in Uganda. This can be a unifying factor and a rallying cry to change the regime. Once the agreed conditions are clear, they need to cooperate all the time - not in election times only!

At this stage, the opposition also needs to bring together a small group of well respected and trusted democracy activists to form an ‘Elder’s Council’ or a ‘Transitional Council’ with representation from all federal regions of Uganda if this is possible. This group should be impartial and must work in the interests of Uganda at large and must not be affiliated to any political party. The council’s role should mainly be to strategically plan, and coordinate the activities of the various opposition, civil society groups and youth movements. Its apolitical chairman should act as our Mandela or Mustapha Abdul Jalil of Libya. He should not be Besigye or any other leader of any political party. But he/she should be someone impartial who can appeal to all Ugandans to unite against the National Resistance Movement. Such a person can be Dan Muliika. He is well respected by all political groups and other kingdoms not to mention citizens. He is also incorruptible. Examples of where such transitional councils have worked include, Libya, The Gathering in Sudan in 1985, Alliance for Change in Ghana in 1995, The Danube Circle in Hungary in 1988, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia in 1989 among others.

Second, the opposition must study Museveni’s strengths and weakness. This will allow them to out manoeuvre him. Lastly, the opposition has to follow the sequence of reforms and these must be followed precisely in order!

Funding

The united opposition should then seek funding from within and outside Uganda but not from Western donors who if used might over burden the opposition with their demands. Internally-initiated reform is far more sustainable and enduring.

Building alliances

The opposition needs to build alliances with civil society groups such as the churches, trade unions or traders, teachers and any other pro-democratic forces. Besides parliament, the opposition must also seize control of at least one or more of the following institutions out of the dictator’s clutches. Namely: the security forces, the media, the civil service, the judiciary, the electoral commission, and the central bank, pack them with their supporters, and debauch them to serve their interests. This is one of the main challenges but not very difficult to achieve if the opposition is organised. One needs to understand that not everyone that works for NRM or Museveni likes him or supports what’s going on in the country. The opposition should co-opt senior army soldiers and police officers to resign and join them.

The game was over for Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak when the military refused to fire on civilians. Ditto in the Philippines in 1986 and Georgia in November 2003, where the security forces were charmed with roses (hence, the “Rose Revolution.”) Ukraine’s Orange revolution of November 2004 won the Supreme Court to its side and Pakistan’s Black Revolution of March 2007 had the full support of the judiciary.

Media

For every revolution to succeed its aims and objectives must be well communicated to the locals. Citizens need to understand what change the opposition wants to bring and how? Will the citizens be better off? Who are the possible next leaders? Will these leaders protect their interests or those things they cherish? This is where the media plays the most important role. In case of Uganda, few people have internet access and no local FM radio can risk doing the kind of mobilisation required to communicate the government out of power. Hence pirate radio stations or shortwave radio frequencies can be a useful tool. A shortwave broadcast cannot be blocked especially if the signal is from outside Uganda. Opposition groups can also use drums that call for strikes or disobedience in neighbourhoods. Everyone that hears the sound of that drum should also get his/her drum and sound it to create a domino effect throughout the country. The ancient kingdom of Buganda used this to great effect throughout its history. Internet radio stations can also be used to mainly mobilise those abroad to support the struggle.

NB. Activists should wear the same chosen colours as a symbol of unity to isolate those who are against freedoms and democracy. Coordination is vital; otherwise presently the opposition is like a headless chicken.

Hit the regime with their constitution.

For example, Article 1 of Uganda’s Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association. The opposition should sue the government where infringements on civil liberties have occurred. In Ghana, they used the Constitution and the courts to free the airwaves, leading to a proliferation of FM Radio stations, which were instrumental in ousting the regime in 2000.

Stretch the police and the military geographically.

The opposition should shut down the civil service and the regime will collapse. It will not have enough soldiers to replace civil servants across the country; we saw this in Ghana in 1978 and Benin in 1989. We also saw the same thing this year, as street protests in Tunisia and Egypt erupted simultaneously in several cities and towns, straining security forces. The regime might increase its brutality at this stage but people should be resilient and where possible defend themselves using anything they have. The main aim here is to make the country ungovernable and no state institution should be operating properly. Whilst this is all happening, the opposition should have another team ready to negotiate with the government but only on terms and conditions laid down by the transitional council. One of the demands that have to be met is for Museveni to resign and then power transferred to the council on an interim basis. If this is not met, citizens should not stop or suspend the fight. At this stage, the council should have already appointed its representatives abroad to lobby foreign powers for help. This help or support can be in form of intelligence, media coverage and sanctions in place to restrict the government from killing its own citizens. Friendly neighbouring countries like Rwanda and Burundi should be deterred from interfering at all.

N.B The opposition should record all human rights abuses in different forms such as videos and expose the regime to the world. We will also need this evidence at the International Criminal Court.

Co-opting soldiers and the police

The majority of the soldiers and police officers have family members who are not in the forces. The opposition should put together a team that contacts these families secretly and ask the soldiers not to shoot or commit crimes against humanity as Museveni will not protect then when the regime falls. They should be reminded that their responsibility is to protect the country from foreign invaders and keeping law and order respectively as opposed to killing their own citizens.

Disassembling a dictatorship

Getting rid of the dictator is only a first step in establishing a free society. The dictatorship must also be disassembled. We didn’t do this in Africa in the 1960’s. We removed the white colonialists and they were replaced by black neo-colonialists, Swiss bank socialists, crocodile liberalists, quack revolutionaries, and briefcase bandits. Africans struggled very hard to remove one cockroach from power and the next rat came to do exactly the same thing. This is because we did not disassemble the dictatorship state.

To disassemble the Uganda dictatorship, the council has to do five things and in precise order. This is like overhauling a vehicle where repairs must be made in order: you don’t fix the transmission when the battery is dead, nor do you install a new sound system when the battery is dead.

Disassembling a dictatorship requires first intellectual reform (a push for freedom of expression and the media); second, political reform (democratic pluralism and free and fair elections); third, constitutional reform (limiting the powers of the executive); fourth, institutional reform (independent judiciary, electoral commission, efficient civil service, and neutral and professional armed forces); and fifth, economic reform, or liberalization (free markets and free trade).

If revolutions don’t follow the above sequence in that order, the consequences can be catastrophic. Reversals of revolutions occurred in several countries because the reform process was out of sequence or haphazard. For example, premature economic liberalization—like the “shock therapy” in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Russia in the early 1990s—produced vampire capitalists.

The institutional reforms and legal framework needed to make economic liberalization to succeed had not been undertaken. The nomenklatura remained firmly entrenched, frustrating reforms. A few (eight) oligarchs used inside knowledge and political connections to gobble up state assets at rock-bottom prices and became instant billionaires.

Most disastrous for Africa was economic liberalization ahead of all other types of reform—like the Washington Consensus. To be sure, economic liberalization engenders prosperity but dictators never level any playing field. They implement only those types of reforms that benefit themselves, their families, and their cronies.

Those African countries that pursued economic liberalization eventually failed the political test and imploded: Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. In Egypt, the street protesters who ousted Hosni Mubarak now seek to roll back his free-market reforms and hold its beneficiaries accountable. The same should be done in Uganda after the NRM has fallen. The Sudhirs and Basajjabalaba’s of Uganda among others will be held to account.

 

NB. If the opposition does not follow this advice, they are wasting our time and should not put people’s lives at risk for no good reason.

 

Please forward this to all opposition leaders and concerned citizens

 

 

For God and my country

Uganda does not need Multi parties at the moment

Hello Ugandans at heart,

UPC, DP, PPP, NRM, CP, JEEMA, FDC, JF, UGP, NDF (plus Vicks Kingo!) and on and on…probably heading for the 623 of the evening of Mobutu’s Zaire, when that country was the most vibrant multiparty democracy in the world.  But the question is, where does factionalism end and where does pluralism begin? When one looks at the random harvest of Uganda’s political elite, all one sees are individuals that are exactly the same, but struggling to be different. They struggle to differ because of the narrowness of the ‘panya’ that leads to the coveted throne where some ruling clique of the day dishes out patronage, lubricated mostly unearned income that is tossed at us in form of aid. 

 Let us take a closer look at Uganda’s demographics.  We are just over 30 million.  Of that, about 27 million, i.e., 90% are peasants.  Let us take another country like France in the past.  In 1789 on the eve of that country’s revolution, the French were 25 million and of that, 23 million i.e., 90% were peasants.  Yes, one could argue that, that was France, and the year was 1789. In other words: different locales, different epochs. But in socio-historical terms, Uganda 2008 = France 1789: 90% peasants and that tells a huge story about our capabilities across the board. 

 But of course you know that when France had the same proportion of peasants like we do now, they did not have political parties. Is it because the French were blind to the virtues of pluralism, and we, Uganda are cleverer? Is it a historical accident that when the earlier modernisers had similar demographics like Uganda’s now they were ruled by monarchs (Mono: single person; archs: rulers)? And I am not a monarchist please….but, with our 90% peasants, the rest being – let us be honest – a lumpen bourgeoisie, a functional liberal democracy seems to be a negative dream in Uganda, as the purposeless jostling between and within our factions clearly demonstrates. 

Attempting to cheat social development will not take us anywhere, because the gravitational pull of our social reality seems to always pull us towards our historical station: mediaevalism: 20, 30, 40 yrs in power by the rulers, just like the Hapsburgs and Tudors; and Hohenzollerns and Shoguns of the earlier modernisers.

 Historically, political parties have always emerged as structures for forming and conveying group interests in VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED SOCIETIES whose structure is the outcome of the transformation engendered by the industrial and agricultural revolutions.

  In societies where political parties emerge, wage labourers at the base, bureaucratic elites in the middle and merchants, owners of capital, financiers, industrialists and land at the top (I am reminded here that, 70% of the land in Britain is owned by 0.7% of the population).  In that kind of set up, a labourer in a factory will not give a damn about the ethnicity of a factory manager.  What the wage labourer wants is a decent minimum wage, low income tax and acceptable working conditions.  The head of his trade union can be any religion or lineage, as long as he is vocal enough to squeeze maximum benefits from the factory owner. 

In those societies, political parties are nothing but the committees that manage the interests of those classes.  For example in Britain which colonised us, the interests of the top third are taken care of by the Conservatives, those of the middle third by the Liberal Democrats (the fence sitters) and those of the bottom third are managed by the Labour Party.  Tell us: whose class interests do UPC or DP or PPP or NRM or CP or JEEMA or FDC or JF or UGP or NDF etc manage? Whose interests does UAH's Nzaana,Abbey Semuwemba, Ochieno, Wambuga, Nsubuga part I, Nsubuga Part II, Nsubuga, Adhola and…..er, L/Cpl Otto represent? Do we speak for wage labourers, landlords, financiers or what? Which class do we speak for?

 Uganda now is a society that is HORIZONTALLY DIFFERENTIATED. The only groups known to the predominant ‘class’ (the 90% peasants) in Uganda are ethnicities, clans, sub clans, lineages, families, castes etc. The consciousness of the 10% (or even less) pseudo elite (one of whom you and I are) is false consciousness arising from what we see across the fence in the global north.

 Now; people, when you impose the structures of interest aggregation and articulation of vertically differentiated polities onto horizontally differentiated countries like Uganda, IT IS AS IF YOU ARE FORCING A PAWPAW TREE TO GROW LIKE A PUMPKIN.  That tree will either die off outright, or become a disastrous weed as it struggles to conform to alien territory: the undulating contours of that horizontal social template of pre-industrialism.  This is what Mr Adhola tries to rationalise by stating that, I quote, ‘This is what UPC and DP for instance are about. DP seeks to improve the status of status of the identity of catholics, and UPC that of certain nationalities or tribes.’ That sums up the basic pathology of Uganda’s politics today.  Uganda with political parties is like a porcupine in a kanzu. 

 The fact is that, political parties are not merely creatures of, but are an upshot of industrialism.  We are not there.  What political dispensation propelled the industrial, vertically differentiated polities to liberalism? It was not multipartyism! Just like a pawpaw tree cannot grow like a pumpkin, or ‘’kalitusi’’ cannot grow like ‘’lumonde’’, liberal democracy cannot thrive in our mediaeval conditions.  We may need to go back to the drawing board!…..Look at what other preindustrial countries had to do to create the infrastructure for liberal democracy.

L/Cpl (rtd) Otto Patrick

UAH FORUMIST